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| FEATURE ARTICLE |
| Michael Onyebuchi Eze | Sunday, September 17, 2006 |
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ezehmichael@yahoo.com
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CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS OR IRRESPONSIBLE JOURNALISM?
Let us pray….
(dis)believe in press, stress almighty, creator of lies and woes, and in its press freedom its only source of our scorn which conceived in self-indulgence, born of pride and arrogance, a catalyst of atomic individualism and flourishing without boundaries and spatial restraints. And in the 21st century it was raised to the pinnacle of honor, wealth and glory and its influence will have no end…
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In the past few months, riots in the mainly Islamic world emerged as a result of anger, anguish, suspicious and general socio-psychological depression in Western-Arab relationship. It all started with a cartoon. The question remains how a cartoon could trigger such massive anger and hurt. If indeed such was the case, why would it take protracted riots, protests and boycotts to elicit and induce an apology from the publishers? No one need to contest the obvious assumption made by the editor of Jyllands-Posten in an interview with the BBC that freedom of expression is a crucial Western value. What detracts me however was his attempt to undermine the sensitivity of the published cartoons by his appeal to freedom of expression. Stressing this point further, he seems to suggest that freedom of expression or press freedom seemingly stands supreme in the face of other core values of human identity. This position is no less than a form of press tyranny. Tyranny of the press here implies that insofar as the press has absolute suasion, control and power over public opinion, they may not care nor consider any implications of violating other people’s right insofar as their action is couched in press freedom or freedom of expression. This rather naïve and simplistic thinking might be interpreted as an impetuous violation of a people’s dignity. It is in line with the above considerations that this short article tries to articulate such misreading. I shall argue that freedom of expression need not negate nor contradict a people’s right to self-determination. In the first section of this article, I shall attempt to demonstrate a relationship between human dignity and personal identity. Just as ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, personal identity recapitulates human dignity. And, if one’s human dignity is contingently dependent on one’s identity, I shall argue that an attack on one’s identity is an attack on one’s humanity and subsequently a violation of one’s freedom and right to self-determination. Furthermore, the relationship between a people’s right to dignity and press freedom are not mutually exclusive. I shall try to argue that the relationship between the two is mutually inclusive.
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Developing approaches which problematize our own unexamined assumptions about the nature of ‘identity’ is a non-negotiable prerequisite for understanding the relationship between Mr. A’s right to freedom of expression and Mr.B’s (or group B’s ) right to self-determination Identity is a multilayered construct socially produced and culturally dependent1. As a socio-cultural dependent construct, identity discourse is simultaneously an ubiquitous and an amorphous concept with an alluring juxtaposition of the public and the private, the social and the psychological, the cultural and the moral, the religious and the profane.
An individual’s self perception is profoundly influenced by one’s social identity. An individual’s identity is constituted by a person’s life narrative which in turn is weaved into assemblage of traits or categories through which a person’s source of identity is constructed and nourished. Everyone possesses this assemblage of traits. An individual’s social identity on the other hand is determined by the level of one’s integration in the social nexus as prescribed by the antecedents of social identity. These antecedents are constructed either as parts of the persona or as a given in the cases of stereotypes and stigmatization. When in doubt or when confronted with a situation, I appeal to my categories or assemblage of traits to draw critical resource. My sense of self definition by and large is made possible and given expression by these categories at the core of my identity. Since one’s sense of identity is significantly constructed around a core that is not ‘I’, the privately experienced ‘self’ and the socially enacted ‘persona’ are mutually and dialectically implicated. In other words, the socially constructed persona is influenced and made coherent by the subjectively experienced, interiorized self that is in constant dialogue with one’s assemblage of traits.
From the foregoing, the following conclusion might evolve: (i) identity is not necessarily bounded, unitary or determinate as often perceived or especially from the dominant discourse of fitting human subjects into boxes labelled with standardised rubrics of ethnicity, race, gender, class and nationality. (ii) The distinction between ‘self’ and ‘person’ or the ‘inner’ world of subjective experience or the ‘outer’ world of social action is neither completely stable nor universal and it is somewhat erroneous to perceive it in a universal form and then apply the same to all persons. (iii) Identity is multidimensional and is not merely descriptive but integrates qualitative aspect that encompasses a holistic antecedent of social identity. How does these all relate to the riots in the mainly Arab and Islamic nations? I shall now pause awhile to examine the burden of its implication.
Muslims (religious and nominal) draw strength from their religion and inspiration from the patriarchs involved in the evolution of their religion. Religion here serves as a prescriptive ethics and a guide to conduct, a thesis which is sustained insofar as a person’s identity is weaved into one’s religious practices and beliefs. If this is the case, any attack on my religious practices and beliefs is an attack on my identity and subsequently on my right to self-determination. Prophet Mohammed (Pbuh) is not just a founding figure of Islamic religion but one of the most revered and sacred figures whose teaching and exemplary life has become a model for all Muslims. The prophet is sacred and holy. The life of every Muslim is weaved around this knowledge as evidence in the Shahadah2. This is the most sacred and at the core of Islamic religious teachings. Apart from being a revered and sacred constituent of Islam, the image of the prophet would necessarily reflect a point of reference like other major figures in other religions like Moses in Judaism, Jesus in Christianity or the Buddha in Buddhism. This does not necessarily imply a regulative ideal in which these prominent figures posses a unitive significance that cuts across or penetrates these religious affiliations. My point of reference is that just as Jesus plays the most significant role in my life as a Christian, any attack on his image or person is an attack on the core values that constitute my identity and therefore a projected aberration on my right to self determination. For Christians as for Muslims or Jews, the teaching of Jesus, the torah, the Koran or the Hadith are constructs with which the identity of their followers is weaved. I do not claim expertise in cultural anthropology or theology, my point is merely to point out a certain relationship between antecedents of identity like religious practices and personal identity as an ensemble of all that I am.
A crucial and pertinent question however is, when does freedom of expression constitute an abuse of one’s identity? A more poignant question seemingly rests in unravelling when and where does freedom of expression begin and ends, and what privileges (if any) has freedom of expression got to flout, undermine or violate other core values of human identity? And yet, more significantly, what qualitative advantage has freedom of expression over the common good? My persuasion, which I could refute or reinforce through empirical undertakings, is that, socioeconomic, cultural, religious and political contexts play a central role in the formation of identity and as such, any statement in identity discourse needs to be conscious and critically sensitive of, among other things, the culture, tradition and religious orientation of any people. The publishers at Jylands-Posten and other European counterparts in making a satire of Prophet Mohammed (Pbuh) do not seem perturbed that there is a contingent relationship between one’s religious practices and an individual’s identity on one level and an individual’s freedom of expression on another level. ‘Freedom’ of any sort does not need to contradict a person’s dignity rather than enhancing a substantive commitment in ensuring that the right to self-determination and freedom is mutually sustained. In fact, freedom of expression, the freedom to announce or express my presence or views and one’s right to self determination expressed in form of religious beliefs and practices are configured as portals between society and the self – crucial synapses in the process of personhood.
When the republicans bayed for the capitulation of Bill Clinton, it was not necessarily because he had an ‘inappropriate’ relationship with a Whitehouse intern rather than an unbecoming behaviour that does not fit into the mode cast for American presidents. Perhaps, more significant would be that Clinton’s freedom of expression (to lie under oath) was severely restricted since the law prohibits lying under oath. Thus, you do not appeal to freedom of expression as an excuse to lie under oath insofar as it hurts or undermines the common good (since for American citizens, lying under oath was simply unacceptable). If we uncritically assume this position, then one might argue that freedom of expression is necessarily not absolute over the common good and even when an appeal is made to such freedom, it has to be qualified.
Let us imagine another scenario. By right, the public has a certain right to information and news of the world around them. Let us translate this to be freedom to know or right to information. The press operates as a gadfly in ensuring that the public is well informed with news that is accurate, devoid of exaggeration or bias. The press in this scenario is a custodian of the common good as it relates to the public right to information. But when scenarios like the Abu Ghraib prison scandals with US marines or the abuse of civilians by British commandos in Basra emerges, would sensitive3 reporting or exercise of restraint amount to suppression of information or impeachment of the press considering the volatile situation in Iraq? Or, could there be an alternative, an alternative that eschews sensational reporting in place of a more constructive dissemination of information. My opinion which could be repudiated or reinforced with further research is that a scenario like Iraq demands a rather constructive and sensitive journalism. This need not contradict the need for objective and unbiased reporting, but empirical evidence which I can rebut or buttress has shown that in situations like Iraq, the nature of such reporting is neither motivated by common good nor inspired by the desire to bring the crises in Iraq under control. The nebulous motivation behind such journalism is induced by power, for fame, for Grammy, for profits (to push up sales or attract advertisement) and to beat competitors. The question that remains unanswered is where one can situate the common good. The answer is that common good was never the reason for such journalism. Under pressure from stake-holders to perform, the press has sold its soul to ambition, its ethics to greed, its sensitivity to profit and its sensibility to fame, irrespective of how this goal is attained.
Thus far, my aim is not to engender a utilitarian position in which the greatest good or maximum benefits outweigh individual benefits4. This need not be my argument insofar as one can reverse the scenario in which an individual’s right to freedom of expression may hurt or even undermine the common good. For example, a projected assault on the Jewish community by a deliberate attempt to deny the holocaust under the guise of freedom of expression or as in the Clinton example above or more crucial, as in the satire made of Prophet Muhammed (pbuh). These are rather simplistic examples that do not do justice to the complexities of this argument. It is not my intention to indulge in these complexities rather than an attempt to show that an individual’s right such as freedom of expression need not negate nor contradict the common good insofar as the relationship between an individual’s right and the common good is not exclusive but mutually oriented and contingently inclusive. To draw an analogy usually associated with Hegel’s communitarian philosophy, the relationship between the individual and the common good could be illustrated with the ocean and its waves. Individuals are like the waves on the surface of the ocean. Waves are not something distinct and separate from the ocean, but they arise out of it and return to it and are simply a manifestation of the force at work in that great body of water. Although the waves sometimes cause horrific damages like the Tsunami, nonetheless, it still relapses to that massive body of water. Once again, the normative identity of the wave is given validity on the basis of its constitutive relationship with the ocean. In other words, a wave is a wave on the basis of its relationship with the ocean. Somewhat peculiar, an individual’s freedom of expression is neither necessarily nor contingently independent of the common good. But, and this is a crucial qualification, my argument would remain valid when contextualized in a community of shared meaning or common purposes. Thus, when grafted within an antithetical framework, the question becomes, what happens when my shared meaning or common purpose confronts the shared meaning or common purpose of other communities? This provokes yet another crucial point at the core of this essay, and what I term ‘the politics of non-recognition’ or ‘the politics of a differential ‘other’.’
What is the politics of non-recognition? The politics of non-recognition or a differential ‘other’ asserts that an individual’s self-identity or self-perception is motivated, sustained and nourished by antecedents of social identity subsisting in an individual’s sphere of shared meaning or common purpose. According to the politics of non-recognition, the pope would be right to argue that Turkey may not be admitted into the European Union because Turkish culture would not conform to such Christian ethics such that informs the socio-cultural and ethical value on which the EU is based. Accordingly, we assimilate only such sphere of common purposes or shared meanings that identifies or reflects our own sphere. Extending this thesis further, the presupposition is always to protect our community’s unique value and cultural identity by a propitious isolation of cultures or people different from us – a substantive feature of cultural apartheid insofar as my socio-cultural community remains a yardstick for a universal ethical standard.
But is the above thesis sustainable if one considers for example that the so-called Christian ethics as inundated by the teaching of Jesus Christ is in fact an eclecticism of moribund traditions, garnished as it were by a constellation of Greek philosophy, conceived in the mind of Aristotle, given expression by the apostle Paul, receiving added value in the writing of St. Augustine, salvaged from obscurity and extinction by Arab and Muslim philosophers, and reaching its most dynamic, systematic and fullest expression in the writings and teachings of Thomas Aquinas. If this is the case, I would not be wrong to assume that the church fathers did in fact borrow from Greek philosophy in their quest to enunciate the teachings of Christ and the subsequent evolution of Christian theology. This is no isolated case. The way we think is a product of our culture and of the cumulative effects of many minds that preceded ours. When we do geometry or mathematics, we are participating in Archimedes’ mental life, and when we think about the physical world, our thoughts are part of the conceptual ripples set in motion by Thales, Newton and Einstein. Thus, even in one’s most creative moments, the spirit of one’s civilization that is itself a cumulative product of many minds permeates one’s mental life.
Reviewing the Turkish question, one might ask whether Turkish culture despite its lack of Christian orientation has a potential complementary value to other EU member countries. The point I am trying to derive at is that we are not mere isolated mental threads, but are part of a larger socio-mental and spiritual fabric. If my thesis is right, the meeting or encounter of every culture is an opportunity for complementarities and growth rather than a panacea for cultural conflicts or clashes of civilizations.
Press freedom is a contingent constituent of every free society. If we agree that the press is at the service of humanity and not vice versa, then it is an imperative for every free society to ensure that the press albeit its traditional role of non-biased but objective reporting, non judgmental but impersonal analysis sustains a responsible and constructive journalism as opposed to irresponsible and destructive journalism. And finally, to argue that some of the ideals enshrined in the UN charter of human rights such as freedom of expression may in principle make the fulfillment of other people’s right to dignity impossible is a formal contradiction, an ontological phantasm in which resolution of all truths is abandoned, all riddles solved and all contradictions reconciled, is nothing but, as Isaiah Berlin (1967:7) would argue, ‘a piece of crude empiricism, abdication before brute facts, intolerable bankruptcy of reason before things as they are.’
